The Paradox of Increase

The Monist 89 (3):390-417 (2006)
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Abstract

It seems evident that things sometimes get bigger by acquiring new parts. But there is an ancient argument purporting to show that this is impossible: the paradox of increase or growing argument.i Here is a sketch of the paradox. Suppose we have an object, A, and we want to make it bigger by adding a part, B. That is, we want to bring it about that A first lacks and then has B as a part. Imagine, then, that we conjoin B to A in some appropriate way. Never mind what A and B are, or what this conjoining amounts to: let A be anything that can gain a part if anything can gain a part, and let B be the sort of thing that can become a part of A, and suppose we do whatever it would take to make B come to be a part of A if this is possible at all. Have we thereby made B a part of A? It seems not. We seem only to have brought it about that B is attached to A, like this

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Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1978 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Nidditch.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Reasons and Persons.Annette C. Baier - 1984 - Philosophical Books 25 (4):220-224.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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