Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged vs. Consequential Commitments

Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50 (2014)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to consider the explanatory resources that Robert Brandom‟s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. 12

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Niels Skovgaard-Olsen
University of Freiburg

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References found in this work

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
[no title].Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

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