Abstract

Panpsychism is the metaphysical doctrine that sees everything in existence as having a mind or mind-like qualities. Some scholars have critiqued this view from the stance of materialism and dualism, grounding their arguments on the inability of panpsychists to account for consciousness in their philosophical postulations. Panpsychist assumptions may be acceptable on one hand, yet refuted on the other, not only because of their failure to address consciousness in the mind-body problem, but because it defies logic to attribute mind and mindlike qualities—the pride of rational beings—to nonhuman entities. This paper examines panpsychism as an attempt to bridge the explanatory gap between materialism and dualism by proposing that all entities, from atoms to complex organisms, possess some form of consciousness. The study explores theoretical foundations through the work of David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel, who argue that panpsychism offers a more plausible explanation for phenomenal consciousness than strict physicalism or dualism. Chalmers presents a deductive argument demonstrating that panpsychism poses fewer problems in explaining phenomenal consciousness compared to physicalism and dualism. The analysis examines key arguments, including the conceivability argument and zombie argument, distinguishing between macro-experiences (human consciousness) and micro-experiences (proposed mental states of microscopic entities) while addressing the fundamental mind-body problem. This paper, through philosophical analysis, examines panpsychism as a philosophical doctrine that posits mentality as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the natural world, including inanimate matter.