Abstract

The overall aim of this dissertation is to present a form of moral realism that neither assumes moral facts are reducible to physical facts nor assumes moral facts exist as some metaphysically suspect entities independent of human action in order to best account for the diversity and complexity of our moral activities and practices. That these two options have been held out as the only ones available to a moral realism is the consequence of the adoption of a view of objectivity better suited to natural sciences than to morals. The view that has largely captivated moral theorists, realists included, is that what it means to be objective is to be causally efficacious and explanatory. This conception contains a problematic assumption about the independence of the objects causing our observations. ;My view begins with the assumption that objectivity in morals is possible only because there are humans engaging in a wide variety of practices and actions that constitute what in Wittgensteinian terms can be understood as the language-game of morals. Objective moral facts can be better understood as reasons for action discoverable or accessible through moral deliberation and inquiry, two actions that are part of the hurly burly of human actions and this complicated form of life. ;One important feature of our moral experience largely undertheorized concerns the role of moral disagreement. Most often the existence of moral conflicts is taken as evidence against a realist position. The normative assumption is that disagreement is a failure. On the views of objectivity and realism advanced in this project, that normative assumption is reversed. Disagreement and criticism are taken as central features for an inquiry or practice to be objective. The absence of disagreement and the lack of critical reflection about our reasons for actions represent a failure in our moral inquiry. ;Dissent and criticism must have a transformative nature as well. Criticism without transformation is like the ornamental knob on the machine that turns but doesn't really do anything. Dissent helps to bring about our discovering better reasons for actions.