‘How Can It Not Know What It Is?’: Self and Other in Ridley Scott's Blade Runner

Film-Philosophy 17 (1):19-50 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay I provide a reading of Ridley Scott's Blade Runner that focuses upon the question of the kind of creatures the Replicants are depicted as being, and the meaning that depiction should have for us. I draw upon Stanley Cavell's account of the problem of other minds to argue that the empathy test is in fact a mode of resisting the acknowledgment of others. And I draw upon Martin Heidegger's account of authenticity and mortality to argue that this acknowledgment is crucial if one would become human. The film does not so much suggest that Replicants are, as such, human, but rather that humanity is won through the encounter with the inauthentic

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-13

Downloads
376 (#126,171)

6 months
30 (#299,398)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Blade Runner’s humanism: Cinema and representation.Joshua Foa Dienstag - 2015 - Contemporary Political Theory 14 (2):101-119.

Add more citations

References found in this work

S. - 2008 - In A. P. Martinich, A Hobbes Dictionary. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 269-298.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Sein und Zeit.Martin Heidegger - 1927 - Annalen der Philosophie Und Philosophischen Kritik 7:161-161.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.

View all 18 references / Add more references