General covariance, gauge theories and the kretschmann objection

In Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani, Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 110--123 (2002)
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Abstract

How can we reconcile two claims that are now both widely accepted: Kretschmann's claim that a requirement of general covariance is physically vacuous and the standard view that the general covariance of general relativity expresses the physically important diffeomorphism gauge freedom of general relativity? I urge that both claims can be held without contradiction if we attend to the context in which each is made.

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John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh

References found in this work

What price spacetime substantivalism? The hole story.John Earman & John Norton - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.
The Hole Argument.John D. Norton - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:56 - 64.

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