Explaining value: The principle of sufficient reason and the realm of value in ordinary cognition

Mind and Language 41 (3):340-362 (2025)
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Abstract

Folk explanatory judgements seem to conform to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), according to which if x is a fact, x must have an explanation. That is, children and adults judge that facts across a wide variety of descriptive domains must have an explanation. We test whether PSR‐conforming judgements extend to the realm of value. Across four studies, we find that adults are less willing to judge that claims about moral and aesthetic value must have an explanation, compared to descriptive claims. Moreover, explanatory judgements about moral and aesthetic claims diverge from judgements about claims concerning affective responses.

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Author Profiles

Shaun Nichols
Cornell University
David Pizarro
Cornell University
Scott Partington
Cambridge University
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