Bound: Essays on free will and responsibility

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Shaun Nichols offers a naturalistic, psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. He argues that our belief in indeterminist choice is grounded in faulty inference and therefore unjustified, goes on to suggest that there is no single answer to whether free will exists, and promotes a pragmatic approach to prescriptive issues.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Replies to Kane, McCormick, and Vargas.Shaun Nichols - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2511-2523.
My Brain Made Me Do It.Paul Bloom - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):209-214.
Why we should(n’t) be discretionists about free will.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2489-2498.
Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology.Kevin Timpe - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.
Introduction: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2013 - In Susan Blackmore, Thomas W. Clark, Mark Hallett, John-Dylan Haynes, Ted Honderich, Neil Levy, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Michael Pauen, Derk Pereboom, Susan Pockett, Maureen Sie, Saul Smilansky, Galen Strawson, Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Manuel Vargas, Benjamin Vilhauer & Bruce Waller, Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-20

Downloads
106 (#469,095)

6 months
37 (#234,823)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?