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Capacitism and the transparency of evidence
Mind and Language 37 (2):219-226 (2022)
Abstract
Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The phenomenal evidence argument.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2025 - Synthese 205 (2):1-18.
The generality and particularity of perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (2):235-247.
References found in this work
Quotation.Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore & Matthew McKeever - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Quotation.Andrea Raimondi & Mark Jago - 1979 - In Hilary Nesi & Petar Milin, International Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier.
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