Can Retributivism and Risk Assessment Be Reconciled?

Criminal Justice Ethics 43 (1):37-56 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper we explore whether or not the use of risk assessment tools in criminal sentencing can be made compatible with a retributivist justification of punishment. While there has been considerable discussion of the accuracy and fairness of these tools, such discussion assumes that one’s recidivism risk is relevant to the severity of punishment that one should receive. But this assumption only holds on certain accounts of punishment, and seems to conflict with retributivist justifications of punishment. Drawing on the broader desert literature, we explain the source of this conflict, and suggest that a retributivist approach on which the severity of punishment partly depends on one’s character in addition to their acts offers some hope of reconciling retributivism with the use of risk assessment tools in considerations of sentencing reduction in particular. Ultimately, however, even this limited attempt at reconciliation fails, so long as risk assessment tools fail to distinguish between risk that one is responsible for, and risk that one is not responsible for.

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2024-03-06

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Author Profiles

Hanna Gunn
University of California, Merced
Toby Napoletano
University of California, Merced

Citations of this work

Contributors.Kelly Oliver, Hanna Kiri Gunn & Holly Longair - 2025 - In Kelly Oliver, Hanna Kiri Gunn & Holly Longair, Gaslighting: Philosophical Approaches. Seattle, WA: SUNY Press. pp. 275-280.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (8):205-20.
The Right and the Good.David Ross - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Philip Stratton-Lake.
Imagining oneself otherwise.Catriona Mackenzie - 2000 - In Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press.

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