Why the converse consequence condition cannot be accepted

Analysis 63 (4):297–300 (2003)
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Abstract

Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.

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Luca Moretti
University of Eastern Piedmont

Citations of this work

Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2008 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 193.
Confirmation.Alan Hájek & James M. Joyce - 2008 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge.
Explanation, confirmation, and Hempel's paradox.William Roche - 2017 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston, Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 219-241.

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References found in this work

Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Asa Kasher - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):747-749.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.

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