Encapsulation and subjectivity from the standpoint of viewpoint theory

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e55 (2022)
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Abstract

The groundbreaking, viewpoint theory of Merker et al. explains several properties of the conscious field, including why the observer cannot directly apprehend itself. We propose that viewpoint theory might also provide a progressive, constitutive marker of consciousness and shed light on why most of the contents of consciousness are encapsulated.

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Ezequiel Morsella
San Francisco State University

References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):227-247.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.

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