Single Premise Deduction and Defeat

Erkenntnis:1-12 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Preface and Lottery paradoxes have shown that competently deducing a novel conclusion from multiple justified premises does not necessarily result in a justified belief. However, those paradoxes do not arise if only a single premise is used. Yet, in recent years, justification closure for single premise deduction has also been challenged. Schechter has presented a case that, according to him, thwarts any attempt to formulate a general principle that links competent single premise deduction to justification. This paper develops a justification closure principle for single premise deduction that accommodates Schechter’s case, thus showing that his pessimism regarding the possibility of such principles is mistaken. I also argue that an alternative reply to Schechter’s case fails and that safeguarding justification closure constitutes progress for establishing knowledge closure for single premise deduction.

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Auke Montessori
University of Glasgow

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Knowledge and its Limits.L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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