Post-physicalism

Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):61-80 (2001)
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Abstract

I am going to argue that it is time to come to terms with the difficulty of understanding what it means to be physical and start thinking about the mind-body problem from a new perspective. Instead of construing it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally physical world, we should think of it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, a world that is at its most fundamental level entirely nonmental. The mind-body problem, I want to argue, is the problem of determining whether mentality can be accounted for in terms of nonmental phenomena. In other words, it is the question, ‘is mentality a fundamental feature of the world’

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Barbara Gail Montero
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

On characterizing the physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.
Physicalism.Amanda Bryant - 2020 - In Michael J. Raven, The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. New York: Routledge. pp. 484-500.
Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - 2019 - In Sam Coleman, The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 62-86.

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