Searchlight on Values. Nicolai Hartmann's Twentieth-Century Value Platonism

Review of Metaphysics 39 (3):559-559 (1986)
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Abstract

Although Nicolai Hartmann's Ethics is one of the most important works on ethics in this century, it is still little known in the English-speaking world, and most probably suffers from the same negligence on the European continent. Eva Cadwallader's book, I hope, will succeed in generating some interest in Hartmann's Ethics. Her book is a very competent exposition of Hartmann's Platonistic theory of values. It is also a critical study. She takes great pains to bring out the exact points of some of Hartmann's highly subtle theses, assesses some of his arguments in order to bring out their strengths and weaknesses, and compares Hartmann's Platonism to other contemporary Platonistic theories, especially G. E. Moore's. On the whole she succeeds, in my view, in making a variety of value Platonism a credible philosophical thesis. Nicolai Hartmann's Platonism--in value theory as much as in his general ontology--is a most unusual combination of seemingly incompatible theses. Cadwallader distinguishes between various theses defended by value Platonists, and shows perspicuously which of them Hartmann accepts and which of them he rejects. A particularly interesting aspect of Hartmann's theory is his combination of Platonism with an open-ended pluralism of values, an axiological fallibilism, a sort of axiological relativism and a rejection of the view that moral issues can always be "objectively" resolved. In fact, although as a Platonist Hartmann maintains that values have an objective Ansichsein, he also insists that there are "objective" conflicts among values--which provides him with one ground for rejecting the resolutionism thesis. Generally, Platonism is combined with a cognitivist theory of values. Here again Hartmann's position is unconventional. He shares with Max Scheler the view that values are "apprehended" in appropriate emotional experiences, and he also argues for the objectivity of values in a Kantian sort of transcendental manner. Cadwallader discusses these aspects of Hartmann's theory in great detail and with competence. In his Introduction to the book, Werkmeister points out Hartmann's differing attitudes towards ethical and aesthetic values.--J. N. Mohanty, Temple University.

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