When visual metacognition fails: widespread anosognosia for visual deficits

Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2024)
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Abstract

Anosognosia for visual deficits—cases where significant visual deficits go unnoticed—challenges the view that our own conscious experiences are what we know best. We review these widespread and striking failures of awareness. Anosognosia can occur with total blindness, visual abnormalities induced by brain lesions, and eye diseases. We show that anosognosia for visual deficits is surprisingly widespread. Building on previous accounts, we introduce a framework showing how apparently disparate forms of anosognosia fit together. The central idea is that, to notice a deficit, individuals need to form expectations about normal vision, compare expectations and visual input, and judge any mismatch at the metacognitive level. A failure in any of these three steps may lead to unawareness of visual deficits.

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2024-10-01

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Matthias Michel
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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References found in this work

The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar, Introspection and Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.

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