How to Derive a 'Not' from an 'Is': A Defense of the Incompatibility View of Negative Truths

Metaphysica 9 (1):79-91 (2008)
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Abstract

Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that every truth has a truthmaker. The case of negative truths leads some philosophers to postulate negative states of affairs or to give up on truthmaker maximalism. This paper defends a version of the incompatibility view of negative truths. Negative truths can be made true by positive facts, and thus, truthmaker maximalism can be maintained without postulating negative states of affairs

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Michael Veber
East Carolina University

Citations of this work

The Hard Road to Presentism.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):314-335.
An Argument for Minimal Logic.Nils Kürbis - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):31-63.
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Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism?Nils Kürbis - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):27-46.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul Aaron Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
What is a Law of Nature?David Malet Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kolbel, Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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