Is science first-order?

Analysis 62 (4):305-308 (2002)
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Abstract

It is a popular view amongst some philosophers, most notably those with Quinean views about ontological commitment, that scientific theories are first-orderizable; that we can regiment all such theories in an extensional first-order language. I argue that this view is false, and that any acceptable account of science needs to take some modal notion as primitive.

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10.1111/1467-8284.00374

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Ulrich Meyer
Colgate University

Citations of this work

How to apply mathematics.Ulrich Meyer - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):17-28.
Modal Property Comprehension.Ulrich Meyer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):693-707.

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References found in this work

Truth and reflection.Stephen Yablo - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349.
Deflationary truth and the liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.

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