Abstract

Contemporary psychology has explored the concept of the self in relation to the second order characteristics of metacognition. On the dominant theoretical framework, cognitive processes are taken to be split into two specifically interrelated levels called the object level and the metalevel, with the latter monitoring and controlling the former. The metalevel is thought to be self referential. For example, retrieving an answer to a question, or making a response to a cue, at the object level, does not involve reflection and is not self-referential. By contrast, judgments about whether the response was or was not true, or about whether one would be able to remember the response later entails second-order or metalevel processing, and it thought to be self-referential and to involve consciousness. This _Reflection_ presents some of recent work on self-referential thought in humans. It also reviews studies of the neurological basis of these judgments, and investigations which have sought to determine whether any animals other than humans have this capacity.