Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Pereboom’s attempt to use his quarantine analogy to justify his theory of crime prevention and the use of preventative detainment in place of punishment. Specifically, I will examine the quality of the analogy drawn between quarantining and preventative detainment and its ability to provide acceptable practical conclusions on the nature of preventative detainment. First, I will argue that the analogy is promising because the two practices share appropriate and relevant similarities. And since the analogy is shown to be promising, I agree with Pereboom that the justification of quarantining can be transferred to preventative detainment. In the second chapter, I will discuss feasible approaches to justifying quarantining. After examining two plausible and contemporary ways of determining when quarantining is just, I will dedicate the third chapter of this paper to applying these justifications to preventative detainment and assess the acceptability of these applications. In doing so, I will discuss the problems that arise when contemporary quarantine justifications are applied to preventative detainment. However, I will argue that these problems are not the result of some flaw in the analogy, but rather stem from a reluctance to accept free will skepticism in general. Thus, if free will skepticism holds, once an appropriate justification of quarantining is found, it can be used to justify the analogous practice of preventative detainment.