Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics

Dissertation, Princeton University (2010)
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Abstract

This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.

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Angela Mendelovici
University of Western Ontario

Citations of this work

Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.

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