Counterfactual theories of causation

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
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Abstract

The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred”. While counterfactual analyses have been given of type-causal concepts, most counterfactual analyses have focused on singular causal or token-causal claims of the form “event c caused event e”. Analyses of token-causation have become popular in the last thirty years, especially since the development in the 1970's of possible world semantics for counterfactuals. The best known counterfactual analysis of causation is David Lewis's (1973b) theory. However, intense discussion over thirty years has cast doubt on the adequacy of any simple analysis of singular causation in terms of counterfactuals. Recent years have seen a proliferation of different refinements of the basic idea to achieve a closer match with commonsense judgements about causation.

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original Menzies, Peter; Beebee, Helen (2001) "Counterfactual Theories of Causation".

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Philosophical Papers, Volume II.David Lewis - 1986 - New York, US: OUP Usa.

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