Properties that Four-Dimensional Objects Cannot Have

Metaphysica 10 (2):135-148 (2009)
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Abstract

The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of additively cumulative properties, including mass, volume, and electrical charge. These properties add up over disjoint objects: for example, the mass of a whole composed of two disjoint objects is a sum of the individual masses of the objects. The difficulty with such properties for four-dimensionalism stems from the way this theory makes persistence depend on the existence of disjoint objects at disjoint times. I consider various possible responses to this difficulty and conclude that they all fail.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Parts : a Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:277-279.

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