Abstract

For decades, the most prominent philosophical work on protest has focused on disobedience. Such work has deemphasized protests that are presumed lawful, especially strikes, boycotts, and mass street protests. It has also perpetuated an inadequate vision of law, lawmaking, and their relationship to protest in liberal constitutional polities—a vision of who makes law, how it is made, the posture of lawmakers toward protest, and the democratic significance of law. A survey of the legal history of strikes, boycotts, and mass street protests demonstrates that this vision is too limited. Most significantly, it shows that disobedience is not necessarily disobedience to democratic authority, even where liberal constitutions reign. Historical review also uncovers the vital importance of legal repression. So any critical philosophy of protest should incorporate a much more realistic vision of law. And these findings about law and protest, when considered along with longstanding doubts about some of the ideas that are foundational to the disobedience literature, also undermine the case for sustaining a special focus on disobedient protest.