Constraining a Class of Observer-Dependent Information Cosmologies

Abstract

This paper presents a contemporary empirical test of a restricted class of observer-dependent information cosmologies—views on which large-scale informational structures (meanings, semantic clusters, conceptual organizations) are generated, collapsed, or reconfigured differently for each individual observer. I construct a distinctive recursive conceptual fingerprint, inject it into the public information ecosystem, and compare its retrieval across independent observers, platforms, and semantic engines. The resulting behavior of search systems, language models, and academic indexes shows that, at the level of the public information layer, semantic structure is stable, shared, and mechanically organized rather than personalized or observer-generated. I argue that this cross-observer semantic invariance constrains informational solipsism and related subjectivist models, at least in this domain: instead of collapsing into private hallucinations, the public semantic field exhibits attractor-like stability, recursive fidelity, and inter-observer invariance. I propose that this can be usefully described as a form of external recursion—a dynamical information system in which meaning persists and stabilizes outside any particular mind. The analysis is explicitly scoped: it concerns information-access reality, not qualia or physical ontology. Within that scope, the results support a mechanistic, Φ-recursive identity framework and challenge strong claims that individual consciousness “generates” informational reality on demand.

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2025-11-27

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