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Sense and certainty: a dissolution of scepticism
New York, NY, USA: Blackwell (1989)
Abstract
This dissertation aims to construct a non-dogmatic defence of common sense. It tries to show why the absence of justification for the judgements of common sense, which the sceptic reveals, does not invalidate them.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.
Philosophical Investigations into AI Alignment: A Wittgensteinian Framework.José Antonio Pérez-Escobar & Deniz Sarikaya - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (3):1-25.
Understanding Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):301-317.
Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.
Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):255-272.
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