Abstract

In his _Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti_, Dignāga refutes the externalists who hold that an external object is composed of substantial atoms. He argues that no theories of atomism defining external objects can fulfill the two criteria for an object-support. According to Vinītadeva and the Chinese Yogācāra tradition, the third position of atomism is a separate thesis from the other two positions. However, Tibetan exegetes and some modern scholars are skeptical about this claim. In this article, I argue that the third position is a more complex doctrine than the other two. It is not one atomic doctrine belonging to a certain Buddhist or Indian philosophical school but a complex of different atomic doctrines with a family resemblance, including those of the Vaibhāṣikas, the Dārṣṭāntikas (Sautrāntikas), and the Vaiśeṣikas. Accordingly, Dignāga's arguments in ĀP 4–5 can be analyzed as targeting different nuances, and all his arguments have their sources in the Abhidharma texts.