Abstract

In their respective works, Bhāviveka and Vinītadeva both refute the concepts of _ārambha(ka)_ and the _samavāya_ in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. The idea of _ārambha_ asserts that a new whole is created (_ā-√rabh_) from its parts, namely, the creative elements (_ārambhaka_); but the whole is a simple substance that is distinct from those parts. The relation of inherence (_samavāya_) is introduced to establish a connection between the whole and its parts, indicating that the whole resides in its parts, and the parts serve as inherent causes for the whole (i.e., the effect). Vinītadeva argues that a whole cannot reside within its parts, either in their totality or through one of its aspects, as either case would negate its status as a simple substance. It is worth noting that similar arguments have been documented in the Nyāya-sūtra and its commentaries, and these debates also resonate in the _Tattva-saṅgraha_-_pañjikā_. The Naiyāyikas reject Buddhists’ arguments due to their divergent mereological perspective on the nature of a composite whole. The Naiyāyikas argue that using terms like ‘entirety’ or ‘partly’ to describe a unitary entity is semantically incorrect. Bhāviveka’s main arguments are also rooted in the Buddhist viewpoint, asserting that a composite object is nothing but an assemblage of its components and therefore cannot be a real and simple substance. Additionally, he questions the transitivity of parthood in a composite whole. This argument, I propose, reveals a mereological problem within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory.