Making sense of relative truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339 (2005)
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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to make sense of relativism about truth. There are two key ideas. (1) To be a relativist about truth is to allow that a sentence or proposition might be assessment-sensitive: that is, its truth value might vary with the context of assessment as well as the context of use. (2) Making sense of relativism is a matter of understanding what it would be to commit oneself to the truth of an assessment-sensitive sentence or proposition.

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John MacFarlane
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Assertion and the Future.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg, The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-504.
The Creative Interpreter: Content Relativism and Assertion.Herman Cappelen - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):23-46.
The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth.Neri Marsili - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (4):540-560.
Shared Content.Herman Cappelen & Ernest Lepore - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith, The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 1020--1055.

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References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein, Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.

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