Functionalism and psychologism

Dialogue 23 (2):239-248 (1984)
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Abstract

Some philosophers suspect that the functionalist account of mind supports a psychologistic account of logic. One who has argued for a connection of this kind is Remmel T. Nunn. If the connection holds, it might be a powerful support for the currently unfashionable position of psychologism; conversely, it might be a damaging objection to functionalism. In either case, to estabjish the connection would be an achievement of considerable philosophic interest.

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Woods on Ideals of Rationality in Dialogue.Jim Mackenzie - 1988 - Argumentation 2 (4):409-417.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Types and ontology.Fred Sommers - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (3):327-363.
Psychologism in logic: Husserl's critique.Jack W. Meiland - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):325 – 339.
Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws.Remmel T. Nunn - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):343-349.

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