Abstract

The fundamental conflict between natural rights theory and institutional determinism(or legal rights) regarding human rights has persisted for a long time. Searle proposes that his theory of status functions can expose the superficial contradiction between these two positions while preserving their respective rational explanations. However, his theory is applicable only to particular instances (tokens) of human rights and significantly lacks explanatory power for human rights as types. This limitation arises from Searle’s rejection of the reducibility between individual and collective intentionality. Through a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Searle’s theory, we propose two amendments: first, an ontological revision aimed at dissolving the cognitive illusion of the subjectivity of the mind; second, an epistemological approach that reduces collective intentionality to a collection of individual intentionalities. These amendments address the deficiencies in the theory of status functions and offer a more coherent theoretical framework to better understand and resolve central issues in contemporary human rights theory. They also provide new directions for exploring the nature of human rights and their implementation.