Conditional-assertion theories of conditionals

In Judith Thomson & Alex Byrne, Content and modality: themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--164 (2006)
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Abstract

Now under what circumstances is a conditional true? Even to raise this question is to depart from everyday attitudes. An affirmation of the form ‘if p then q’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent…. If, after we have made such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out true, then we consider ourselves committed to the consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves false. If on the other hand the antecedent turns out to have been false, our conditional affirmation is as if it had never been made.

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William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

A Theory of Conditional Assertion.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (6):293-318.
What 'If'?William B. Starr - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
Conditionals, Meaning, and Mood.William Starr - 2010 - Dissertation, Rutgers University

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