Abstract

This paper argues that moral error theory faces a heavyweight demarcation problem analogous to expressivism’s ‘creeping minimalism’ (Dreier 2004). I propose a framework for meta-theories that diagnoses this internal demarcation failure. Under global minimalism, error theory’s ability to distinguish error-theoretic discourses (e.g., ethics) from success-theoretic ones (e.g., physics) is trivialised. While Tiefensee (2019) claims minimalism reduces error theory to global moral skepticism, I contend that error theory’s substantive demarcation hinges not merely on the categorical falsity of moral claims but on the soundness of its core argument: moral discourse presupposes objective facts (the conceptual claim), which do not exist (the ontological claim). By adopting a feminist-inspired minimalism about objectivity—where objectivity is procedural, tied to discursive practices like public scrutiny—error theorists gain grounds to defend the conceptual claim, which gives moral error theorists reasonable grounds to adopt minimalism. Yet minimalism simultaneously renders the ontological claim false, collapsing the distinction between moral and paradigm realist discourses. Some potential responses like bifurcation and inferentialism to the problem are also considered and critiqued.