Abstract

The extent to which clinical ethics consultations should be neutral with respect to religion is the subject of ongoing debate. One important position says that clinical ethics consultants ought to appeal to the secular bioethical consensus that is available to everyone inasmuch as possible, and that they can do so without the subsequent need to defend an underlying moral theory. This view has been criticized because it is doubtful that such a consensus exists. Abram Brummett argues for a more nuanced approach where clinical ethicists must appeal to the bioethical consensus in clinical settings, but that the consensus and underlying moral principles can be debated in academic contexts (2020). Furthermore, he suggests that the consensus need not avoid making at least some moral, epistemological, and metaphysical commitments, though not to the level of embracing a full-fledged comprehensive worldview. I argue that Brummett’s approach fails because it does not successfully avoid the implications of the lack of a secular bioethical consensus. Any defense of such a consensus is only possible at a superficial level where there may be agreement on which moral concepts to use, even though deep disagreement remains about their nature and application. While Brummett’s approach is more honest than some secular alternatives because it does not seek to avoid making any judgments about underlying commitments, it is ultimately uninformative in failing to address the fact of pluralism. To conclude, I suggest that even if I am mistaken and there really is a secular bioethical consensus, Brummett’s view implies that the consensus can never be legitimately challenged in clinical settings.