Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness

Philosophy 69 (270):397 - 415 (1994)
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Abstract

It is a commonly-held belief that ignorance excuses. But what of moral ignorance? Is a person blameless who acts from “false” moral principles? In this paper I shall try to show that such a person is blameworthy. I shall produce an argument that connects the acceptance of moral principles with character, character with moral responsibility, and moral responsibility with the justifiability of blame

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Citations of this work

The epistemic condition for moral responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.
What Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):478-496.

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References found in this work

Involuntary sins.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.
Immorality.Ronald Dmitri Milo - 1984 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wickedness.S. I. Benn - 1985 - Ethics 95 (4):795-810.

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