Abstract

Abstract: The growing debate over zetetic responsibility—our duty to inquire or inquire further—has split into two main camps: the epistemic camp, which treats it as a distinctive form of epistemic normativity, and the practical camp, which argues it is wholly practical. This paper contends that both views are incomplete. Zetetic normativity is pluralistic, grounded in practical, socio-epistemic, and genuinely epistemic reasons. Through an analysis of cases—including high-stakes decisions, social-epistemic roles, and situations involving salient or opaque evidence—I show that obligations to inquire arise from varied sources. To unify these, I advance a Zetetic Transmission Principle: if an agent has final reason to adopt a settled attitude toward a question, and inquiry serves as a means to that end, then they have a corresponding reason to inquire, matching the nature and strength of the final reason. This framework not only addresses objections such as overgeneralization and normative clashes but also clarifies the structure and source of zetetic obligations. In doing so, it offers a more nuanced and comprehensive theory of why, when, and in what form we ought to inquire.