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Theoria 89 (3):393-406 (2023)
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Abstract

Thin Objects has two overarching ambitions. The first is to clarify and defend the idea that some objects are ‘thin’, in the sense that their existence does not make a substantive demand on reality. The second is to develop a systematic and well-motivated account of permissible abstraction, thereby solving the so-called ‘bad company problem’. Here I synthesise the book by briefly commenting on what I regard as its central themes.

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Øystein Linnebo
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

Linnebo on Analyticity and Thin Existence.Mark Povich - 2024 - Philosophia Mathematica 32 (3):332–357.
Why thin objects rather than ultra-thin?Øystein Linnebo - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):2575-2588.

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References found in this work

Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann, Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account.Øystein Linnebo - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Construction of Logical Space.Agustín Rayo - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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