Philosophical Considerations of Artificial Consciousness

Abstract

Whether AI can achieve consciousness has evolved from philosophical speculation to scientific inquiry, driven by the rapid advances in AI. The powerful capabilities of large language models necessitate a fundamental reconsideration of artificial consciousness beyond human-centric frameworks. We address a critical gap in AI philosophy: how to conceptualize consciousness in AI that exhibits sophisticated cognition without subjective phenomenology. We propose para-consciousness as a non-phenomenal form of artificial consciousness that emerges from self-referential world-modeling in artificial neural networks. Unlike human consciousness, anchored in qualia, para-consciousness manifests as functional coherence through latent space dynamics, enabling contextually adaptive behavior without requiring a first-person experience. We present a novel framework that reframes the hard problem of consciousness for machines as the problem of grounded coherence, explaining why predictive processes yield contextually meaningful outputs without requiring embodied intentionality. Para-consciousness shifts the paradigm from simulating human-like subjectivity to engineering verifiable operational awareness. We analyze the impossibility of AI achieving human unified consciousness and the possibility of AI achieving human-like consciousness from staged consciousness.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2026-05-25

Downloads
98 (#528,422)

6 months
98 (#125,681)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):227-247.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
A framework for consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 2003 - Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.

View all 7 references / Add more references