Dynamic Abstraction

In Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-74 (2018)
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Abstract

Any abstractionist approach to thin objects faces the threat of paradox, as illustrated by Frege’s inconsistent Basic Law V. The neo-Fregeans Hale and Wright respond by severely restricting the class of acceptable abstraction principles. Their approach is _static_ in the sense that they hold the domain fixed. This approach to abstraction is criticized, and an alternative approach is developed which permits abstraction on a vast class of equivalence relations. This alternative approach is _dynamic_ in the sense that abstraction on an extensionally specified domain (i.e. a domain specified by means of a plurality of objects) may result in a larger such domain. A form of absolute generality is nevertheless possible, provided that the associated domain is understood in an intensional sense (i.e. it cannot be specified by means of a plurality).

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Øystein Linnebo
University of Oslo

References found in this work

Abstract objects.Bob Hale - 1987 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
The potential hierarchy of sets.Øystein Linnebo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):205-228.
The iterative conception of set.George Boolos - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (8):215-231.
Nominalist platonism.George Boolos - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):327-344.

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