Abstract

This dissertation explores different reasons for an individual's judgment that his or her own life either is, or is not, worth caring about. My investigation concerns an individual's first-person judgment about his own life, not about the lives of others, or human life in general. First, I present an analysis of what it is to care. Then I explore two sets of reasons which an individual might take to count either for, or against, the judgment that his life is worth caring about. The first set of reasons concerns self-detachment, or an individual's capacity to be indifferent towards his own personality or character-self, and the troubling philosophical reflections that self-detachment raises. The second set of reasons concerns the awareness of mortality---whether an individual's awareness of his own eventual death presents reasons either in favor of, or against, the judgment that his life is worth caring about. Three sub-sets of associated reasons are considered: first, whether an individual's awareness of his own death is painful because it frustrates the desire for an indefinite number of future pleasures, and thus counts as a reason against care; second, whether a person's judgment that his life must be like a story or meaningful narrative to be judged worth caring about is plausible; and third, whether the Heideggerian notion that a person's awareness of his own death makes 'authentic' or individual choice possible, supports a judgment of care