Abstract

In ordinary social life, people are routinely treated as if they were stable, knowable essences—objects whose identities can be reliably inferred from brief encounters, narrow contexts, or isolated performances. This dissertation argues that such certainty is not merely epistemically weak but structurally harmful. It proposes that persons, as they appear in experience, are not encountered as fixed entities but are constituted within the observer’s mind as counterfactual distributions: fields of imagined trajectories generated under conditions of uncertainty. These distributions are affectively charged, consolidated over time, and capable of exerting causal influence on the observer’s present perception, emotion, and moral judgment through what this work terms a near-time-travel effect. The dissertation introduces the Imaginative Potential Field (IPF) as a formal model of social perception. The IPF specifies how limited evidence-slices trigger scenario-branching, how iterative cycling revises and weights these branches, how valence (positive or negative imaginative potential) is assigned, and how this valence modifies the observer’s present state prior to additional evidence or contact. The model treats social imagination not as ornament or error but as an operative mechanism with identifiable stages, outputs, constraints, and failure modes. Across five chapters, the dissertation develops this model with conceptual rigor. It first diagnoses collapse—the reduction of a person into a single context-invariant identity claim—as a metaphysical error that confuses situational appearance for essence. It then formalizes the IPF mechanism, demonstrates the role of context as a revelation/concealment function, and analyzes systematic breakdowns of the model, including projection, valence-lock, contamination loops, and total cinema, in which imagination substitutes for contact. The final chapter advances porosity to reality as an ethical discipline: a set of operational rules and protocols designed to preserve imaginative richness while preventing self-sealing certainty. The dissertation’s central claim is not that judgment should be abolished, nor that imagination reveals objective truth about others, but that imagination is already causally active in social life and therefore carries moral responsibility. By treating persons as distributions rather than verdicts, the Imaginative Potential Field offers a framework for more accurate social perception—one that resists premature certainty without surrendering accountability, and that relocates ethical responsibility to the moment where perception is first constructed.