Abstract

This paper discusses the meaning of openness as a guiding principle for scientific inquiry within democratic societies. To this aim, it contrasts Henri Bergson’s and Karl Popper’s takes on the open society, proposing Bergson’s interpretation as instantiating a humane interpretation of openness, while Popper privileges a rational one. The bulk of this paper compares the humane and rational visions of openness provided by Bergson and Popper, thereby highlighting the commonalities and differences between these views and their subsequent legacies. I then use this distinction to examine the history and current socio-political role of open inquiry – and particularly of research processes now carried out under the heading of ‘open science’. The final part of the paper briefly examines how humane and rational openness relate to current debates on open science and related disagreements over the procedures, goals and outputs that scientific research should incorporate and encourage to support societal advancements. In conclusion I argue that while Popper’s take on open inquiry has so far won the day in inspiring research policy and governance, contemporary debates on open science and its role in society would benefit from considering Bergson’s approach, thereby paying attention to the centrality of connections (intellectual as much as emotional) among human beings as backbone to successful communication, constructive critique and creative exchange.