I—The Humean Thesis on Belief

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper suggests a bridge principle for all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief to the effect that belief corresponds to stably high degree of belief. Different ways of making this Humean thesis on belief precise are discussed, and one of them is shown to stand out by unifying the others. The resulting version of the thesis proves to be fruitful in entailing the logical closure of belief, the Lockean thesis on belief, and coherence between decision-making based on all-or-nothing beliefs and on degrees of belief.

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Citations of this work

Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield.
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40).David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb - 1739 - Mineola, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.

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