Rationality and Trustworthiness

ProtoSociology 8:183-196 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Our rationality depends on the reasons we have for accepting and preferring what we do. But where do reasons come from? What makes what I accept a reason for a conclusion or what I prefer a reason for action? We can explain where reasons come from without postulation or regress. The explanation rests on our trustworthiness combined with our acceptance of it and our preference for it. The explanation reveals that theoretical and practical reason are intertwined in a loop of trustworthiness in what we accept, what we prefer and how we reason. The loop is the keystone of our rationality.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-31

Downloads
63 (#953,609)

6 months
25 (#409,042)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Keith Lehrer
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Probable and The Provable.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1977 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
Epistemic circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
Thomas Reid.Keith Lehrer - 1989 - New York: Routledge.

View all 14 references / Add more references