Wildman’s Defense of Sparse Modalism and a Dilemma of Post-Finean Modalism

Axiomathes 30 (5):531-547 (2020)
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Abstract

Since K. Fine’s influential criticism of modalism, many philosophers have agreed that we cannot understand the concept of essence with that of modality. However, some philosophers have resisted this mainstream position. In this paper, I examine N. Wildman’s claim that, unlike other versions of modalism, his version of modalism, namely Sparse Modalism can save modalism. I will argue first that if we introduce the notion of grounding into this debates, Wildman’s criticisms of other versions are significantly undermined. Next, I will argue that since Sparse Modalism has an implicit commitment to grounding Wildman cannot blame revising other versions modalism with the concept of grounding. From these claims, I will conclude that the prospect of the success of modalism in general is at best dubious. Without the concept of grounding no version of modalism can succeed and with the concept of grounding no version is well motivated.

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reprint Lee, Jaeho (2020) "Wildman’s Defense of Sparse Modalism and a Dilemma of Post-Finean Modalism". Global Philosophy 30(5):531-547

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Making Things Up.Karen Bennett - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.

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