Abstract

This thesis first considers a question about Plato's causal terminology, and then turns to particular questions about active causation in the Phaedo and Timaeus. I argue that the terms aitia and aition do not in Plato mark a distinction between propositional and non-propositional items, but do indeed have different ranges of meaning: aitia, but not aition, can refer to someone's reason or ground. I then turn to the Phaedo and argue that Plato is there largely concerned with causal explanation. Teleological and causal explanation are conjoined in that acts of nous are considered both reasons and causes. I argue furthermore that in the "safe" and "more subtle" aitiai, Plato's metaphysical schema fundamentally includes "immanent entities" that are active causes, although they do not have internal sources of motion. I then argue that in the Timaeus, too, teleological and causal explanation are conjoined. The Timaeus, moreover, does not, as it is almost always assumed to, abandon the forms of explanation Plato develops in the Phaedo. On the contrary, in the Timaeus, Plato incorporates the "safe" and "more subtle" aitiai, and maintains the view that immanent entities are active causes. I accordingly challenge the view that the Demiurge is the only active cause in the teleological explanations we find in the Timaeus