Individuals and Identity

In The Metaphysics of Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway: Monism, Vitalism, and Self-Motion. New York, US: OUP Usa. pp. 71-101 (2023)
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Abstract

This chapter examines Margaret Cavendish’s and Anne Conway’s view on the nature of individuals. It explains how Cavendish and Conway, who are both monists, explain the fact that there are multiple individuals in the world and how these individuals can be distinguished from other individuals. It argues that both Cavendish and Conway track identity over time by the ordering and arrangements of parts of individuals. For Cavendish, this involves the arrangement and ordering of all the matter of an individual from birth to death. For Conway, this involves tracking the changes of ordering of the central spirit. The chapter explores each philosopher’s views on the generation, growth, and death of individuals, and their views on the unity of the mind.

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Marcy P. Lascano
University of Kansas

References found in this work

Margaret Cavendish's Epistemology.Kourken Michaelian - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1):31 – 53.

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