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The supertask argument against countable additivity
Philosophical Studies 168 (3):619-628 (2014)
Abstract
This paper proves that certain supertasks constitute counterexamples to countable additivity even in the frame of an objective (not subjective, à la de Finetti) conception of probability. The argument requires taking conditional probability as a primitive notionAuthor's Profile
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References found in this work
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Countable additivity and the de finetti lottery.Paul Bartha - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
The form of the Benardete dichotomy.Nicholas Shackel - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):397-417.
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