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Secret charades: reply to Hutto
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1183-1187 (2022)
Abstract
In reply to Daniel Hutto’s “Getting Real About Pretense,“ I defend my theory of pretense against his claim that it is subject to counterexamples by clarifying wherein the value of the analysis lies. Then I argue that the central challenge still facing Hutto’s “primacy of practice” approach, as well as other 4E approaches to pretense, is to explain the link between pretense and deception.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense.Marco Facchin & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2024 - Erkenntnis 90 (5).
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense.Marco Facchin & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2025 - Erkenntnis 90 (5):2095-2117.
(Still) defending mental fictionalism: A response to commentaries on Mind as Metaphor.Adam Toon - 2026 - Philosophical Psychology 39 (3):1140-1152.
How to Distinguish Pretense from Non-pretense? Representationalism vs “4E” Cognition.Yuchen Guo - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
References found in this work
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2012 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. Edited by Erik Myin.
Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Stephen P. Stich.
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind.".Alan M. Leslie - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (4):412-426.
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