Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction

Kantian Review 20 (1):25-51 (2015)
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Abstract

I give an argument against nonconceptualist readings of Kants claim that intuitions and concepts constitute two distinct kinds of representation than is assumed by proponents of nonconceptualist readings. I present such an interpretation and outline the alternative reading of the Deduction that results.

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Thomas Land
University of Victoria

Citations of this work

From Being to Acting: Kant and Fichte on Intellectual Intuition.G. Anthony Bruno - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):762-783.
The Shape of the Kantian Mind.T. A. Pendlebury - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):364-387.
Animals and Objectivity.Colin McLear - 2020 - In John J. Callanan & Lucy Allais, Kant and Animals. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 42-65.
Kantian Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism.Colin McLear - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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